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STUDIES OF ECONOMIC PROBIEMS
OPTIMAL POLICIES FOR MONETARY CONTROL*
nyRoli1RT S. PINDYCKANt)STEVIN M. Ronikis
This paper will present some optiini:ation i'xperiaients using a lint'ari:ed iersionf the l"&'ch'ral Res.erie
Boards monthly money marker model, which was designed pr/manic to study the impact[ policy Instru-
ments on inoticiari' and financial targets. Using linetir-quadriitic optimal tiiiitriil. wecohabited optimal
policies for a single instrument. unhorrowed niserres. wit It ihi'bjectirt' of forcing monetary aggregates and
interest rates to (of/mt desired paths. There is a conflict between the choice of poiicr target. i.e..there is a
trade-off between the control of monetary aggregates and the control of interest rates B calculating a set
of optimal policies using difh'renr objeLtires. that trade-off can he dc,no,isiriued. The optimal strategies are
alSo cukuiated using closed-loop control si as to correct for ratidoni disturbances. It is shown hoivi/ic
existence of random disturbances ,nodifie.s i/ic turge! trade-of/s between monetary aggregatesand interest
rates, and requires greater flexibility in t he nioeme',ts of the controltunable.
1.INTRoDuCTIoN
Recent applications of optimal control theory toeconomic stabilization policy
problems have usually involved calculating time paths for one or more"global"
policy variables so as to minimize some macroeconomic costIunctional.i The
aim of these exercises has been to indicate how policy objectivesrelating to GNP.
employment, prices, and the balance of payments might best beattained. The
policy variables which can be manipulated might include tax rates.the level of
government expenditures, and the money stock. Tax ratesand the level of govern-
ment ey'ionditures are subject to ratherdirect control. However, the money stock
cannot be controtted directly by the FederalReserve: the Fed can however,
manipulate other variables wch in l'n affect the moneystock.2
The ultimate concern of monetary t,olicy-makers is withthe real economy
and how policy involving monetary (e.g.. the moneystockt and financial (e.g..
interest rates) variables can best be used toattain the desired levels of GNP.
employment, prices, and the balance of payments. Theinability to directly control
these policy "instruments" has resulted in a two-stageoptimization process in
which these instruments are in fact "intermediate" targetsand the true policy
instruments are those variables over which theFed has direct control. e.g., required
reserve ratios, the discount rate,ceilings on interest payments on bank liabilities,
and the use of open market operations to affecteither unborrowed reserves or the
* This paper does not necessaril) reflect the views of the Board of Governorsof the Federal
Reserve System or its staff. We wish to express our appreciationto Franco Modigliani. James Pierce.
William Poole. Thomas Thomson.and Peterlinsleyfortheit helpful comments Wewouldhketo thank
Walter Dasis and Lucy McCurd for their programming assistanceand Nancy Wilson for her espert
typing. Revised July 1973.
See, for example. recent work by Chow [6].[7]. Friedman [10]. Livescy [14], Pindvck [16]. [17].
and Sengupta [18].
2 During the past few years, there has been a controversy over the ability of the Federal Reserve to
control monetary aggregates. For a discussion of some of the issues. seePierce and Thomson [IS]. Dat is
[8]. and Andersen [1].
207Federal Funds rate.3 This. iii fact, is essentially the "Y monetary pouic
k fornin-
lated and executed. Several times a year, objectives for U N P. empJoyiieit
prico,
and the balance of paynients are s1ecilied. Then a tilenhi of possible
monetary policy courses and the consequences of each is analy/ed and noiritl
iliterfilediate
target paths are chosen for one or two quarters ahead (on a monthly
basis) At
more frequent intervals, e.g.. every three or four weeks, current money
market
conditions and prospects for economic activity are analyzed illmeetings of the
Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC). The nominal paths forthe control
instruments are frequently revised on the basis of this current information
particu-
larly if the monetary and financial target variables have (lcvjaledfrom their
nominal trajectories by a significant amount.4
This paper will study the problem of how a monetaryauthority' can best
manipulate the policy instruments which it can directly control in orderto reach its
intermediate target objectives. We recognize 'hat Ifl sonicSenSe an intermediate
target strategy may be less optimal than approaching the problem of
economic
stabilization directly. However, given that monetary policy iscurrently formulated
ustng intermediate targets and that more frequent information about real
economic
variables is needed to solve the sta hilization problem directly,we feel justified
in exploring ways to improve the intermediate target variableapproach Our ainis
are rather modest. We seek to examine only two problems whichSeem to be
fundamental to the realization of any optima) monetary policyplan. These areas
follows:
First, given a set of chosen intermediate target paths("optimal" or otherwise)
for the money stock and market rates of interest,we would like to indicate how the
Federal Reserve might best ilianiptilate those policy instrumentswhich it can
direct control.5 In other words, whatis the Fed's optimal policy given that it
would like the money stock, and other variables,to track as closely as possible
some specified time path? This optimal control problems willhe treated in a
linear quadratic framework, applying the solutionderived by Pindyck [16], [17]
to a linearized version of a monthlymoney market model constructed at the
Federal Reserve Board. Optimal policiesfor monetary control will be calculated
using several different cost functions,for both deterministic and stochastic
cases.
Recent articles b Holbrook and Shapiro [ii[. Waud [211. and Karkn Mriench, and Wallace
[131 discuss the use of intermediatetaroets in monetary policy formulation. They indicaie that if
information about movementin targeted sariabtes. i.e.. GNP. emp!uiment. etc.. were asailablein-
stantaneously it sould be niore optimal forpolicyniakers to relate the instruments ovet which they hase direct control to their primarytargets. They do not claim to know how suhoptinial the intermediate
target strategy may be. However,given that information about real economic sariables is asailabtc onb
quarterly or monthly butmonetary and financial data is available weekly. dails. andeven hourly, the
use ofan intermediate target strateov. sincea uses all asailable information. nia he hetierthan making policdecisions onl) when informationabout real sariabtes becomes a'.ailabk.
For a discussion of monetarypolicy formulation see Atlrod {4 5The day -to-day esecution of
monetary policy is handled primarily by theOpen Market Desk, which faces yet another control problem: that 01 manipulatingIts portfolio of gosernment securities ina way which wilt niinimtie the
deviation of the prirnar) control instrumentfrom its specihed path. Fota discussion ofthisproblcm.see Holmes [12].
In the model whichwe use in this paper, the discount rate and either unhorrowedreserves or the Federal Funds Rateare instrument variables We hase chosen unhorrowedreserses rather than the Federal Funds Rateas an instrument
2OSecond, since the set ofinterniediate targets may not be completely compatible,
and therefore, the objectives of themonetaryauthoritymaynot he mutually
obtainable, we would like to know what the trade-offs are between these different
targets. This, of course, depends on what the targets are and on the relative import-
ance assigned to each of them. The objective, for example, of controlling only the
money stock or only some short-term market interest rate might be feasible, at
least after a few months' lag. The Fed, however, may have more than one inter-
mediate policy objective, e.g., it may wish to reach target values for both the money
stock cuid an interest rate simultaneously. This may be impossible. Even in a
deterministic world there may be a required trade-off between objectives.
One of the goals of this paper will be to derive a "trade-off curve" which
relates the minimum achievable root-mean-square deviations from the target
path for the money stock to that fot the interest rate. This trade-off curve would
depend not only on the dynamic structure of the monetary sector, but also on how
"incompatible" the two target paths are which were chosen by the policy makers.
In a stochastic world the trade-off would probably be worsened. Then, even a
.single target would probably not be reachable exactly. We will examine the sto-
chastic case in this paper by calculating optimal monetary policies, and plotting
a "trade-off curve" using closed-loop stochastic control under the assumption of
certainty equivalence.6
In the next section of this paper, we will briefly discuss the monthly money
market model developed at the Federal Reserve Board. We will present our
linearization of that model, and its re-specification in state-variableform.7Next,
we will describe the deterministic optimization experiments performed with that
model. Optimization experiments were designed to indicate the characteristics of
optimal monetary policies, and also to illustrate the inherent trade-off between a
monetary and a financial target variable. Stochastic optimization experiments will
be presented in the next section. Residuals from an historic simulation are used as
random shocks, and optimal policies are calculated by applying the deterministic
control law to the model in a closed-loop fashion. Again, a trade-off curve is
calculated, and this, as well as some individual optimal instrument paths, are
compared to the deterministic case.
2. THE Moint.
The model is a reestimated version of the Federal Reserve Board's monthly
model of the U.S. moneymarket.8It was designed to provide insight into the
short-run behavior of the money market and also to serve as a basis for predicting
the consequences of alternative monetary policies. The version presented here has
ten estimated equations and eightidentities.9The main instrument of control in
6 We consider only additive error terms that are uncorrelated. Under the certainly equivalence
theorem (the "separation theorem" in the control literature), the deterministic control law is optimal
when used in a closed-loop fashion. See Theil [19]. Chow [7]. and Athans [2].
For a discussion of the state-variable form ofa model, see Aihans and FaIb [3] or the Appendixof
Pindyck [16].
The model is described in detail in its original version in Thomson. Pierce and Parry [20].
The currency equation was dropped from the original version of the model, and currency was














































an thethe modcl is the level of uriborrowed reserves: however, the ld fldalSO Use the
discount rate as a policy variable to influence hank borrowing behavior if itso
desires.
There are three sectors iii the model :the private (Oil-hank),commercial
banks, and the Government. The interaction of these sectors (lCtCrflUfles values for
demand deposits, negotiable certificates of deposit. other time and Saving deposits,
public and bank holding of Treasury bills, excess reserves, borrowed reserves and
the rates on Federal funds, negotiable certificates of deposit, prime commercial
paper, and corporate bonds. Itis assumed that the public's demand formoite'
market instruments is constrainedbywealth.Banks are constrained bytotal
liabilities. i.e., deposits less required reserves. These constraints make the demand
functions homogeneous in dollar values.
A list of the model's variables and their definitions is presented below:
ENDOGENOUS VARIABLES
M I----Money Stock (Currency plus Demand Deposits)
DDM SDemand Deposit Component of the Money Stock
OTS--Other Time and Savings at Commercial Banks
CD Negotiable Time Certificates of Deposits
DEP----Deposits at all Banks less Required Reserves
TTSC--Total Time and Savings Deposits at Commercial flanks
TTSM--Total Time and Savings Deposits at Member Banks




RTBRate on Treasury Bills 90 Days
RFF Rate on Federal Funds
RCDI'Primary Rate on Negotiable Certificates of Deposit
RBaa--Moody's Baa Corporate Bond Rate
RCP--Rate on Prime Commercial Paper
QTBPQuantit' of Treasury Bills Field by the Public
QTBBQuantityof Treasury Bills Held by Banks
EXOGENOUS VARIABLES
I. SiSeasonal Component DDMS Equation
S2--- Seasonal Component-- OTS Equation
S3----Seasonal Component ---C'D Equation
S4Seasonal Componcnt---R FE Equation
S5--Seasorial Component--EXR Equation
S6---Seasonal Component--- QTE3P Equation
Pll---Personal Income Almon lagDDMS Equation
P12Personal income Almon lag-- OTS Equation
We have chosen to normalize the modelso that unborrowed reseres serse as the exogenous
control. The model can also he normalized so that the Federal Funds. Rate, rather than unhorrossed
reserves, is the main policy instrument. This is doneb) using an estimated equation for borrowings and
an identity ror unborrowed reserves.
A polynomial in personalincome is used as a proxy for total wealth since a good measure of















P13--- Personal Income Alniong lag---QTBP Equation
ROTSSavings Deposit Rate (7th District) Almon Iag---OTS Equation
IPI-- Industrial Production Index Almon lag--RCP Equation
CONS--Constant Term
RRND--- Reserves Required Against Non Deposit ItemsRR Identity




2. RDIS--Federal Reserve Discount Rate
Let us present an overview of the model by considering the organi/ation oF its
three sectors. The public sector of the model could be summarized by the expression
given in (1):
DDMS+CURR+CD+OTS+QTBP+(OAPBL)=W.
l-lere OAP is other asset holdings of the public and BL is loans from the banking
system, Except for currency, which is exogenous, the first five terms in (1) are
determined explicitly within the model. Thus, given a proxy for total wealth W,
we could solve for the composite asset (OAP - BL).
The banking sector is summarized by the expression given in (2):
RR -F EXR + QTBB - BORR - DDMS - CD - 0Th = (K - OAB).
Required reserves are estimated from an identity which links the public sector to
the banking sector through the components of the money stock, CD's,and other
time and savings deposits. Excess reserves is determined explicitly in themodel and,
when added to required reserves, determines the total reserves (TR)held by the
banking system. Total reserves less unborrowed reserves, which aredetermined
by the Federal Reserve, yields the amount of borrowings from theFederal Reserve
as given by
(3 BORR = TR - UR.
The total quantity of Treasury Bills outsanding (QTBT) is controlledjointly by the
Treasury and the Federal Reserve so that thequantity of Treasury Bills held by
banks is given by
(4) QTBB = QTBT - QTBP.
Thus, one may calculate the composite item for the banking system (K -OAB) if
desired.
2.1. The i%.Iodel's Eqwition.s
The estimated equations of the model arepresented below, with i-statistics in
parentheses. The variables Sl, S2,, etc. refer toseasonal variables. The variable
Urefers to the CochraneOrcutt correction termused in the estimation.




ALMON DISTRI t3UTU) LAG WII(IUTS
0.0669240.0535480)401680.0267840.013394 -
(4.013) (13.81) (7.230) (3.106) (1.966)
RTB -0.000059 -0.000208 -0.0003230.(X)0403 -0.000449-000o400
(-0.3039) (- 1.497)(- 3.063)1-- 4.218)1-4.491)(-4354)
1-61-7t-8
RTB -0.000437 --0.000379 -0.000287 -0.00{)161
(-4.146) H 3.959)(- 3.807)(- 3.684)
P1 Alnion is 2nd degreeConstrained to 0 at i -
RTB Almon is 2nd degreeConstrained to 0 att - 10
R2= 0.9988SE. = 657M'2D.W. = 2.307MEAN DDMS177.9 B




Oilier Time and Sarings Depositsat Conimercial Banks tOTS) 13
(6)OTS = 1Pl1 +JI1RTB,. P1, + ;'1ROTS,1P1,+ S2,
+0.9786P1,U-
ALMON DISTR!BUT[[) LAG \VUGI-IT.S
P1 0.028727
((.455)
RIB -0.001482 -0.001322 -0.001170-0.001024 -0.000884 -0.000751
(-6.111)(-7.419)(-8.749)(-9.080)(-7.874)(-6.203)
ROTS 0.0003160.0009160.0016670.00243 70.0030920.003499
(0. 3089)(0.6474)(1.233) (2.328) (3744 (3.522)
12 M refersto millions of dollars. and B to billions of dollars
This equation and equation 8lwere originally estimated in ra;io form, which is why the Co
efficients of the Cochrane-Orcuttterm arc so large










Oct.-. 0.007969 (- 16.50)
Nov.-0.006350( - 15.17)






RTB --0.000624 -0.000504 -0.000390 -0.000283 -0.000182 -0.000088
- 4.834)(- 3.839)(- 3.120)(- 2.588)(--2183)(- 1.866)
ROTS 0.0035260.0030410.001910
(2.735) (2.230) (1.922)
P1 Almon is 3rd degree Constrained to 0 at t + 1 and t- 5
RTBAlmon is 2nd degreeConstrained to 0 at t - 12
ROTS Almon is 3rd degree Constrained to 0 at i-t-I and t - 9
R2 = 0.9877S.E. = 743 M D.W. = 0.98 14 MEAN OTS= 17013
S.D. OTS = 6.6 BS2, = Seasonal Coefficient1P1
Seasonal Coefficients
Jan.0.00 1357 (2.935) May 0.002429(2.929)
Feb. 0.001934(3.174)June 0.001217(1.477)
Mar. 0.002846 (4.001)July 0.000980 (1.246)




Quantity of Treasury Bills Held by the Public (QTBP)
-- 5 4 4 4
(8)QTBP = P11±1.?iRCPrP1i -FyRTB.P1, ±S61
i=O -O
±0.9910P11U. i.
ALMON DISTRIBUTED LAG WEIGHTS
1i-it-21-3
P1 0.0083150.0132290.0148880.013199
(0.5220) (1.029) (7.759) (1.043)
RCP --0.000545 -0.000719 -0.000751 -0.000642
(-0.7339)(- 1.614)(- 1.656)(- 1.388)
213
P1 + 0.00225 RCDP. P1
(6.903)
(RBaa - RCP) Pt + S31











Negotiable Time Cert fi cares of Deposits (CD)




R2 = 0.9995S.E. = 582 M D.W. = 1.642
S.D. CD = 6.7 BS3, = Seasonal Coefficient1
Seasonal Coefficients
Jan.0.0 1057 (2.886)May 0.00952 (2.656)
Feb. 0.00977 (2.768)June 0.00971(2.659)
Mar. 0.00974 (2.279)July 0.00163 (3.137)









P1 Alrnon is 3rd degree('onstrained to 0 at i + I and I S
RCP Almon is 2nd degreeConstrained to 0 at i - 5
RTB Almon is 2nd degreeConstra!ned to 0 at i - 5
R2 = 0.7481S.E. = 710 M D.W. = 1.705MEAN QTBP = 38 B






Rate onTreasuryBills (R TB)
4







RTB -0.05045 -0.08095 -0.09337 -0.08690 -0.07153 -0.04104
(-0.9505) (- 1.226) (- 1.634) (- 1.888) (-1.511)(- 1.043)
RF.FAlmon is 2nd degreeConstrained to 0 at i - 5
RTBAlmori is 3rd degree Constrained to 0 at t + I and i- 7
R2 = 0.6295S.E. = 0.2475 D.W. = 1.423MEAN RTB5.254°c
S.D. RTB = I.067°
Excess Reserues (EXR)'4
EXR = 0.001433 DEP -0.000764 DEP. KI+ 0.096884 ALJR
(16.541) (-12.128) (--2.010)
-0.090868RR + S5, + 0.3153 U
(-1.775)
0 prior to 1968-10
K) =
LI after 1968-10
After September 1968. as a result ofa change in Regulation I). required reserves are based on
deposit levels two weeks earlier. Asa result, the dummy variable K I is introduced to capture the effect of
this structural change.
214
July-0.00238 1 (- 3.485)








(1.646) )3.043) (3.030) (2.685)d on
Ct of




Primary Rate on NegotiableCertificates of Deposit (RCDP)'
(12)RCDP = 0.95390 RIB NORUN +0.13632 (RBaa-RTB)' NORUN
(20.764) (3.035)




(1.0 if no Run-off occurs
NORUN =
0.0 otherwise
RUN = 1.0 - NORUN.
The variables NORUN and RUNrefer to the effect of Regulation Q ceilings onthe CD market.
If the rate on CD's is driven to theceiling by market forces, no new CD'swill be issued and a run-off
occurs. This is explained furtherwhen we discuss the linearization ofthe model.
BORR UR
(11)RFF-0.37139 + 239.785 + 0.69062 RDIS - 18749
DEP DEP
+ RTB11 + S4, + 0.8646U.




RTB Almon is 2nd degreeConstrained to 0 at t - 3




0.9175S.E. = 67 M D.W. = 2.100 MEAN EXR285 M
S.D. EXR = 97 NIS5, = Seasonal Coefficient1 . DEP
Seasonal CoeffIcients
Jan._0.0001117(--l.200) July-0.0002221 (- 2.136)
Feb.-0.0000577 (-0.497) Aug.-0.0001048 (- 1.002)
Mar. --O.0001132(-i.057) Sep.-0.00013801- 1.372)
Apr.-0.0002581 (-2.515) Oct.-.00001419(--1.484)
May -0.0000647 (-0.6217)Nov. -0.0000064 (-0.0732)
June _0.000l156(-1.091)
S.D. REF = 1.535S4r = Seasonal Coefficient.
Seasonal Coefficients
Jan. 0.026738 (0.3 19) May 0.339200 (2.256)
Feb. -O.00930 (-0.086)June 0.396140 (2.727)
Mar. -0.069757 (-0.554)July 0.268329 (1.937)




DISTRIBUTED LAG WEIGHTS i-It-2i-3t-4i-St-ô
-0.00120-000373 -0.00713-0.010930.014660.01786
(-0.1985) (-0.4143) (-0.7416) (- 1.252)(- 1.955k(-2.443) 1-7t-8-9 _..101-Il
-0.02008-0.02083 -0.01967-0.01 611--0.00971
(- 2.333)(- 2.023)(-- 1.764)(- 1.576)(- 1.440)
RCDP Almon is 3rd degree Constrained
R2 = 0.9994S.E.0.1523;D.W. = 1.121
S.D. RCDP = 0.732
Rate on Price Commercial Paper (RCP)
RCP = 1P1,/Ipj, []1RTB1 + 0.24097 RCDP + 0.9 198 U
(13) (2.180)








RTB Almon is 2nd degree

















Constrained to 0 att -
Constrained to 0 at I + I
toOattandt - I2






R2 = 0.9270S.E.0.1756D.W. = 1.611MEAN RCP6.156 S.D. RCP= 1.300°.
Long Ter,n Rate-Moody'sBaa Corporate Bonds(RBaa)
MBaa = 0.19631 ARTB± O.33852 RBaa+ 0.0783 U_1
(4.580) (3.678)




RR = (KB1)MI+ (K2B2)M1 -i'- K3CD+ K4OTS + RRND.
'6K1,K3, K3 .and K4 are therequired reserve ratios againstdemand deposits at Reservecity and country banks, CD's, and othertime and savings respectivelyRI and 82 are the ratiosof demand deposits to .'i4I at Reserve cityand country banksrespectively.
216Total Reserves (TR)
TR= EXRt- RR.
Deposits Less Required Reserves (DEP)
DEPDDMS ± TTSC - RR.
Total Time and Souing.s Deposits at All Co,nmercial Banks (TTSC)
TTSC = OTS ± CD.
Total Time and Savings at Member Banks (TTSM)
TFSM = 0.7787 TTSC.
Quantity of Treasury Bills Held by Banks (QTBB)
QTBB = QTBT -- QTBP.
Member Borrowings from the Federal Reserve (BORR)
BURR = TR - UR.
The model imposes market clearing in both the reservesand the bills markets.
Interest rates adjust to equilibrate exogenous supplies withquantities demanded.
The Treasury bill rate is determined explicitly using thequantity of bills held by
banks. The Federal Funds Rate, which clears the reservesmarket, is estimated to
depend upon both the amount of bank borrowings from theFederal Reserve and
the amount of unhorrowed reserves available. Threeadditional interest rates are
determined endogenously: the primary rate on CD's(RCDP) is estimated as a
supply relationship; a reduced form equation isused to determine the rate on
prime commercial paper (RCP); and a simple Koyck type termstructure equation
is used to estimate a long term rate, the rate onMoody's Baa Corporate Bonds
(RBaa). The other identities give variables needed toclose the model.
2.2. Strengths and Weaknesses of theMode!
The design of the model, its monthly timeframe, and its focus on the U.S.
money market, makes itpossible to observe and to some extent isolate the sources
of fluctuations which influence intermediate monetarycontrol. The use of budget
constraints in the public and banking sectorsprovides some insights into the
reaction of the money market to exogenous shocksfrom the real sectors of the
economy. The use of polynomialdistributed lags makes it possible to avoid the
estimation problems produced by the use oflagged endogenous variables. They
also provide information regarding lags in thetransmission of monetary policy.
Finally, the use of non-seasonally adjusted dataavoid the problems of possible bias
built in by seasonal factors.
The model does have a number ofshortcomings which if corrected would
increase its ability to provide insightsinto the operation of the money market by
adding structural information, and, in turn,additional channels for the transmission
of monetary policy. The model does notdifferentiate between the behavior of
banks of different sizes which are subject todifferent reserve requirements against
217demand deposits. Nor does it have a mechanism for handling cash drains or inflows
to the banking system. In fact, except for the quantity of treasurhills held by
banks, excess reserves, and required reserves, the asset side of the banking Sector's
balance sheet is not explored. Thus, banks' portfolio adjustments with respectto
loans and long term U.S. Government Securities are not developed : these relation-
ships are not easily identifiable with monthly data.
2.3. The Lmeari:a ito,:
The model as estimated is almost linear in its original form. Nonlinearities
do arise for two reasons. First, the desire to have the model homogeneousin
dollar values makes it necessary to impose restrictions through budgetconstraints,
and this implies weighting interest rates and seasonal dummies by eitherpersonal
income or deposits. Second. the CD market is nonlinear because of theexistence
of interest rate ceilings imposed by Federal Reserve Regulation Q. Thenonlinearity
manifests itself in the dummy variable describing the run-off phenomenonin the
CD market, as will he described below.
The nonlinearities which arise from the homogeneity of themodel were
overcome by multiplying the coefficients of endogenously determined independent
variables by the mean value of the particular weighting variablecalculated over
the control period of interest" For example, in the DDMSequation. the Treasury
bill rate coefficients are multiplied by themean of Personal Income calculated




The seasonal variables are handled somewhat differently.For example, since P1
is exogenous, we can form a series for theseasonal variable from the following
relationship:
S 1Seasonal Coefficient1. P11
which is an entirely exogenous series.Calculation of the linearizedexogenous
variables are shown in Table 1.
The nonlinearity in the CD market isshown explicitly in the equation for
the CD primary rate. When the equationwas estimated, a test for the occurrence
of a CD run-off was made and ifno run-off occurred we set RUN= 0 and
NORLJN = 1.18 In 1971, the periodwhich we will be using for the control
experiments, we know thatno run-off occurred. Therefore, we set NOR UN=
and do not include the dummy variablewhich pertains to run-off periods.
In order to evaluate the performanceof the linearized form of themodel, we
ran a twelve-period simulation of both the linearand nonlinear forms of the model. The root mean squarederrors (RMSE) for the 10 stochasticequations used in
An alternative method is to allow thecoefficients to change in each period, i.e.,the coefficients would be multiplied by the actual valueof the weight variable in eachperiod rather than the mean This would involve specifying A0,. .4,.B1,, and C,,.: = t T.
The test compares the secondary CD




SI, = SEASONAL,. P1, (DDMS)
S2, = SEASONAL,. P1, (OTS)
S3, = SEASONAL, Pt, (CD)
S4 = SEASONAL (RFF)
S5 = SEASONAL, DEP, (EXR)
S6, = SEASONAL,. Pt, (QTBP(




P13, = Pl, (QTBP1
ROTS, = a, P1, tOTS)
ii. IPI ; lPIIPI, (RCP)
TABLE 2
MoI)EL ERROR ANAlysis- --1971
(1) (2) (3) 14)
Lineari;ed Non-Linear
Standard Model Model Ratio of
Variable Error RMSE RMSE Column 2 to 3
DDMS 657 3.130 2.284 1.37
OTS 743 5,291 3,644 1.45
CD 582 1,012 887 1.14
QTBP 710 1,357 1.647 0.81
EXR 67 35 39 0.90
RFF 0,207 0.453 0.421 1.07
RIB 0.248 0.48 I 0.460 1.05
RCDP 0.152 0.475 0.467 1.02
RCP 0.176 0.471 0.453 1.04
RBaa 0.102 0.397 0.406 0.98
the model and the estimatedstandard errors arc shown in Table 2.In simulation,
the forecasting performance of themodel depends on the initial, conditions, so
that the results shown would bedifferent if a different startingpoint were chosen.
A twelve-period simulation waschosen because in the controlexperiments we
are interested in the12 monthsof1971. If a shorter time frame wereused in the
simulation, the RMSE wouldprobably be lower. This is especially trueof the
linearized versionofthe model which uses the meanlevelsofpersonal income
and deposits as weights in someof the equations.
In threeofthe ten equations (the quantityof bills held by the public, excess
reserves, and the rate onBaa bonds), the linear version haslower RMSE than the
219nonlinear version. In five of the other equations, the differences in RMSFare less
than 15°., the nonlinear version having lower RMSE's. Only twoequations the
demand deposit component of the money stock, and other time andsavings
deposits at all commercial banks, have an RMSE substantially larger in thelinear
version of the model. This result is due to the high elasticity of I)1)MSand OTs
with respect to personal income. Consequently, the weighting ofcoefficients by
mean personal income causes large RMSE's in these equations.
2.4. State- Variable For,;i of the Model
Before optimization experiments can be performed, the modelmust be pu
in the state-variable form:
x- x1 = Ax1+Bu1 +C:1
with known initial condition
x1 is a vector of endogenous variables, u1 a vector of control variables, andz a
vector of uncontrollable exogenous variables. New state variablesmust be defined
to replace those variables that appear in the model with lagsgreater than one
period. The definitional equations of these variablesare then appended to the
model.
We will assume that the actual values of the controlvariables RDIS and UR
are the results of, and equal to, the desired levels thatwere specilled by decision
makers in the previous period. This will make themtrue control variables. The
control variables as they appear in the Federal FundsRate and excess reserves
equations and in the borrowings identityare lagged by one month.
Another problem which we recognize but shallnot deal with at this point is
that of the CochraneOrctitt serial correlationadjustments which were employed
in the estimation. These terms will be omitted in thepresent formulation of the
model since their basic function isto give more efficient estimates of the coefficients
in the estimated equations. However,in simulation they are quite importantas a
mechanism for keeping the equationson track. At a future time, we will experiment
with incorporating them into themodel.
The state variable form iscompleted by adding 28new state variables and















RCDP7 = RCDPRTI38 = RTI38 RCDP8 = RCDP
RTR9 = RTB RCDP9 = RCDP
RTB1O = RTB10 RCDPIO = RCDPO
RFFI = RFF1 RCP! = RCP1
RFF2 = RFF7 RCP2 = RCP2
RFF3 = RFF3 RCP3 = RCI'3
RBaal = RBaa URI = UR1
The new model is now in this form:
= A0x, + ,41v,+ Bu,_ +C1z,_.
There are a total of 46 state variables (18 endogenous variables and 28 new slate
variables), two control variables, and 15 exogenous and uncontrollable variables.
3. DimiiiisricOl'TINIIZATION ExPERI1ENTs
3.1. Formulation of the Problem
The linear-quadratic tracking problem involves the minimization of the
cost functional:
J = {(x1 -1)'Q(x ± (u1 - 1YR(u
subject to the constraints of the economic system
= Ax + Bu1 + Cz
with initial condition x0 = .Equation (29) is lust the state-variable form of the
econometric model; x is the vector of state variables, u the vector of control
(policy) variables, anda vector of uncontrollable exogenous variables. Equation
(27) can be expressed in the form of equation (29) by setting its coefficient matrices
equal to:
(3O I + A = (I - A0Y'A1
B = (I - A0)'B1
C = (I - A0L'C1.
In order to conserve space, the ,1, A1, B1 and C1 matrices of the model are not
presented here but are available on request.
The vectors.and i, represent the nominal (ideal) state and control vectors
that we would like to track as closely as possible, and we assume that they have
been specified for the entire planning period. The matrices Q and R determine the
relative penalties for deviations of the target and control variables respectively
from their nominal paths. Typically, Q and R arc diagonal matrices, although this
is not necessary. Varying the weights on the diagonal of Q allows us to place more
or less emphasis on monetary versus financialvariables.
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The nominal trajectories used in the experimentswere chosen to reflecta smoothingofthe groth paths that act italloccurred br t)1Oflclaraggrega
over 1971 with interest rates, excess reserves, and borrowings heldconstant Thj condition was set bortli because it was lel t thatpolicymakers would likeSlflO(h long term growth in the aggregates, and stationaryinterest tatt. Over 1971the money stock grew at approximately 6 percent. a Ilgure which hasgenerallheel) interpreted as a long-run target of FONIC policy.
It should he noted that the growth rates whichpolicymakers talk aboutare for seasonally adjusted data. The model whichwe use is structured interms of nonseasonally adjusted data so that the nominaltrajectories will not tooksmooth although the trajectories for the underlyingseasonallyadjusted dataare cOflStrlic ted assuming smooth growth paths. Thenominal trajectoriesare presented in Table 3. The demand deposit component of themoney stock. seasonallyadjusted expands at a 6 percent annual rate compoundedmonthly. This and all otherseries are transformed to non-seasonally adjusted levels using theratio OfnOn-seasonttiy adjusted (N.S.A.) to seasonally adjusted(S.A.) data. M Iis formed byadding actual N.s.A. currency to the N.S.A. I)DMSnominal patti. Thenominal paths for other time and savings depositsat commercial banks andnegotiable certificates of deposits grow at seasonally adjustedannual rates of I 75 and 25percent respec- tively. These growth ratesare close to the actual ratesofgrowth over the historic
12-month period, and are assumedto he compatible with the 6percent growth in DDMS. TTSC's nominal path isthe sumof01'S and CD. Thenominal path for total reserves is basedupon a growth rate for seasonallyadjusted data of 8.2S percent.
The nominal paths for BORR,EXR, RTB. RFF, and RI3aaare constant as mentioned above.' Aconstant level of I3ORR given thenominal path for total reserves yields the nominal path fortin borrowed reserves, the majorcontrol instrument. The level of nominal borrowingsand nominalexcess reserves are set near the actual averages for the period.The nominal paths forthe interest rate variables which the policymakers are mostconcerned with are kept stationary because it is felt that inour experiments such an "ideal"strategy would be neutral in its effect on themoney market. The same is true forthe discount rate, the minor control instrument 20 Thenominal discount rate is abovethe nominal short term rates, and the Treasury billrate is set below the FederalFunds Rate. This ordering makes the discountrate a true penalty cost, thediscount windowa trite lenderof last resort, and FederalFunds an attractivealternative to Treasury hills.
Although we have specifiednominal paths for IIendogenous variablesonly a subset of those will havenon-zero weights specified in theQ matrix. When a zero weight is assignedto a variable in theQ matrix it does not enter into the objective function(equation (28). All ofthe nominal pathsare presented here for completeness
During 1971 none ofthese variables exhibiteda definite trend, therefore, their nominalpaths were set at their means
20 In
the experiments thatfoiIo. the discountrate is forced to follow its nominalpath This is done by assigninga sery high weight to the
corresponding coetlicient in the R matrixWe did not make the discount ratean uncontrollable
exogenous variable because insome experiments iwhich are not reported here) a lowerweight was assignedto it, allowing it to deviatefrom Its nominal path
I'FABLE 3
NOMtNAL P,i its
3.2. Deterministic Poller Experiments
The Federal Reserve Board may, as part of its objectives, try to reach target
values for both the money stock and some interest rate simultaneously. This may
be impossible even in a deterministic world, and in fact a trade-off curve could
be derived which relates the minimum achievable root-mean-square deviation
from the target path for the money stock with that for the interest rate. In the
first set of experiments, a trade-off curve will be derived for the objectives of
















































































































































































































































































































































vilI bemeasured tising the root -mean-square devuit ions as definedCqtiatiOflS(3





We vi1l calculate these root-mean-square deviations OnlYover the second
six months of the planning period. There arc two reasons for this. First,we would
like to allow six months for the target variables to get "on track."because of the
lags inherent in the transmission of monetary policy. Second,even though we allow
the optimal control program to run for 1months, we ignore the lastsix months
of results because of possible end-point problenis thatare inherent in a finite
horizon optimization problem.
A single trade-off curve is obtained by performingseveral optimization
experiments in which different weights are placedon the Q matrix coefficients
for the money stock and the interest rate. All of the othercoefficients in the Q
matrix are set to zero. in the R matrix,a very high cost is associated withthe
discount rate, but almost no cost is attached to the level ofunborrowed reserves.
so that this variable is allowed to move freely. For any particularcombination of
weights on Ml and RTB, the optimal solution vil I giveus one point on the trade-off
curve.
The trade-off curve for the first set ofexperiments is shown graphically in
Figure 1. The corresponding resultsare presented in Table 4. Letus examine
some of the more obvious aspects of these results. First,note that it is very difficult
to come close to the nominal path for themoney stockhowever, it is notso
difficult to hit the interest rate exactly.This can he seen in experimentsA and F
respectively. In experiment A.a very high cost is attached to themoney stock,
and no cost to the interest rate. Nonetheless,the root-mean-square deviation for
the money stock is 713 milliondollars. In experiment F, however,where a high
cost is attached to the interest rate andno cost is attached to the money stock,we find that the root-mean-squaredeviation for the interestrate is less than two basis
points.
Second, note that whena high cost is attached to the money stock, the trajec-
tories for variables other thanMl behave wildly. Interestrates, borrowings. and
unborroved reserves all oscillatebetween extreme values thatare sometimes even
negative. This may in part hea limitation of the linearized model, hut itseems to
indicate that it is rather difficultto frce the money stock to follow its nominal
path exactly,at leaston a month-[oinonth basis. Al! ofthisseems to hea preliminary
indication that (within thecontext of this model) it might he preferable forthe
monetary authority to focusmore attention on interest rates rather thanon the money stock.
The results thatoccurred when large relativecosts were attached to the money stock seemed tous to be unreasonable. Therefore,we ran a second set of
experiments in which some penaltyis imposed when borrowings deviates from
its nominal path. Itwas felt that this modificationwould make the results more
224TABLE 4
Note: In each experiment R(UR) = 1.0 and RIRDIS) = 1 x 10''. Root-Mean-square deviations
for MI, BORR,and URarcin mitlionsoldoltars. while thosefor RTH and RDIS areinpereelit per sear.
In experiment D. Nil and RTB are weighted equaIl(afler adjtisttnn for their mean valuest.
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
RMSE (RIB)
Figure 1Trade-Off Curve Between Mt and RTI)
realistic since the Federal Reserve Banks do administer the discount window.
setting limits both on the quantity and the frequency of member hank borrowing.
The results for this second set of experiments arc presented in Table 5 and
Figure 2. In these experiments, the cost coefficients for Ml, RTB. UR. and RDIS
are the same as they were before. but now a relatively low cost is also aitached to
the level of borrowings (about 5 percent of the costs attached to Mi and RTI3(.
In examining these results, we first note that attaching a cost to borrowings
seems to, at least in part, cleartipsome of the strange results that occurred in
experiments A, B, and C before. Overall, the controllability of M I does decrease
somewhat, but this is expecte(I. The interest rate, borrowings, and unborrowed









RlM:I, isiiTRAIfl OiHi (WI I N NIANtI RTU
Root-NIetnSquare 1)eviation
Experinient QIMI) Q(RTB) MI RTH HORR VR RDIS
A IxtO" 0 73 56.914 523.225 623.991 0.017
H 2 x l0 Ix I0 1,494 10.515 62(119 72.215 0.01)1
C 2 xto' Ix 10" 1.955 5.076 12.485 15.706 0
D 200 I I 0" 2.475 3115 5.796 6.965 0
E 20 I lO 2MS 1.654 2.921 3.660 0













The discount rate wanders off its path slightly,particularly when a high penalty
is attached to MI. This is not surprising sincenow the discount rate is penalized
less heavily relative to borrowings, andafter all, the discount rate is the cost of
borrowing.
Note that the trade-off for thisset of experiments is backward-bending, i.e., the
root-mean-square deviation for the bill rate doesnot decrease rnonotonicafly as
we increase its relative Cost. The same behavior is alsotrue ofunhorrowed reserves,
whose root-mean-square deviationalso does not decline monotonically. l'he
reason for this is that, as we decrease thecost on MI to zero, the effective relative
cost on borrowings increases. Thus,when in experiment F we insist on a level of




URRD QIRTB) M! Rr13 BORR
A I lOb u I96 5533 12,162 11,321 0629
B 2lO lOS 2,826 2.828 4,942 6.105 0.253
C 2 x l0 ix iO 3,453 1597 2,538 3,141 0.132
D 200 lOb 5.067 0.210 474 424 0.025
E 20 Ii0 5.514 0.192 62 62 0.003
F 0 Ix tO' 5.572 0.222 Ii 229 0.000
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Trade-off Curve Betwcn MI and RTB (with Q(BORR)= 5000)
5level of unborrowed reserves be used through its influenceon other markets to
make this possible. We note also that the discount rate followsits nominal path
exactly in this experiment, so that the only Instrument thatcan he used to control
borrowings is the level of unborrowed reserves.
Again, the results seem to indicate that the interest rate might hea better
target variable than the money stock. We can see from the results that the loss
of controllability of Ml (as we decrease its relative cost) ismore than offset by an
increase in controllability of RIB, and furthermore that this increase in control-
lability of RIB is accompanied by more reasonable behavior in the levels of
borrowings and unborrowed reserves.
In Figures 3 through 10, on the following pages. we have plotted the results
for experiment E both when there is zero weight on borrowings anda non-zero
weight on borrowings. In particular, we look at the endogenous variables Ml.
RIB, REF. OTS, CD, BORR. and RRaa, as well as the policy variable UR. In
each graph, we plot the two optimal trajectories and the nominal trajectory. Note
that when there is a weight on borrowings, the optimal path for unborrowed
reserves is somewhat higher. This s because a higher level of unborrowed reserves
is needed so that there will be less need for borrowing. This higher level ofun-
borrowed reserves allows both OTS and CD to get closer to their nominal paths.
As would be expected, when the Federal Reserve supplies less reserves, i.e.,
when unborrowed reserves are lower, banks, in an effort to meet reserve require-
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Figure 101 !nhorrowed reserves (UR)
make portfolio adjustments by selling interest-bearing securities, thus lowering
the price of those securities and raising the effective interest rates. We indeed see
this effect uniformly in the experiments. When unborrowed reserves are lower,
the Treasury bill rate, the Federal Funds Rate, and the Baa rate are all higher.
4. STOCHASTIC OPTIMIZATION ExIERINIENTs
4.1. Formulation of the Problem
In this section of the paper, we vill repeat the experiments performed earlier,
but now taking into account the effects of random shocks on the model. We will
assume that the only random shocks affecting the model are additive noise terms
which are not autocorrelated. thus allowing certainty equivalence to be invoked.
Our modelIS flOWgiven by equation (33).
(33) = Ax, + Bu, + Cz +. &.
The error vectors c4 in equation (33) are generated by either adding or sub-
tracting the residuals obtained from a simulation of the model. These residuals
will only be generated during the first 12 months of the 18 month planning period,
since we will not be interested in the performance of the model during the last
six months.
The optimal solution to this stochastic control problem is obtained by
applying the deterministic optimal control solution to the model in a closed-loop
231
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24manner. Recallhal the (leteiFflifliSt IC optimal control solution Yieldsa linear
feedback rule, i.e., ills of the lirnt:2 I
(34) = + G
In the deterministic prohleiii. x can always he prdiued cxactlover the entire
planning period. Now, however, the application of the optimal control inthe
first period may not result in the expected optimal state Vector in the second period
since the model is subject to random shocks. Thus, the optimal Control in the
second period must compensate. or correct, for possible deviations in thestate
vector from its optimal path.
In the experiments that follow, we begin with the given initial conditionx0.
and apply the deterministic optimal control u. Given u. the modelgenerates
.v1 and then computes= .v4- :,whereIS (lie i)O!SC vector in period I. The
deterministic optimal control solution is then used to obtain tigii't'n this
In the second period, the model calculates x2 using uas the input, and then
computes2 =2 + i;.This process is repealed tintil all of theus and.'s
have been calculated. This closed-loop optimal control process is shown diagram-
matically in Figure 11.
There are two primary objectives in the following experiments.First, we
would like to see how the trade-off curve changes as a result of theinfluence of
random shocks. We would expect the trade-off to becomeworse. i.e.. no matter
what combination of weights we chose for M 1 and RTB, theroot-mean-square
deviations for both would he larger. The question, however, is howmuch worsen
As we will see, if the monetary authority allows itselfmore flexibility with respect
to movements in the control instrument, i.e.. in unhorrowedreserves, then the
trade-off curve is not very much worse at all. Whatwe want to demonstrate as
the second objective of these experiments is exactly this point, i.e.,that the monetary
authority must allow itself greater flexibility withrespect to the movements of its
instrument variables.
4.2. Stochastic Policy Experinie,sis
In our experiments we willuse as values for the error vectorsin equation
(33) the residuals generated froma simulation of the model.22 Two experiments
IOptimal Coritro! i.aw
u' F1 G
(disturbance) Model -= Ax + 13u, + Cz1
Figure IIClosedloopcontrol
See Piridyck[l6.
Thismethod was an expedient allernatiseto performing a setfMonte Carlo esperinlents. It shouldalso be pointed out thatone can analytically obtain the expectedsumofsquaresofdeviationsoi
the sariables from theirtarget paths, as shownby Chow [7]
232vill be performedin the first the residuals will be added and in the second the)
will be subtracted. These residuals will only he generated for the first 12 months
ol the IS-month planning period, since we will not be interested in the perlorniance
of the model during the last six months of the period.
In the results which follow, a weight was attached to the level of borrowings,
as in the second set of deterministic optimization experiments. This should he
kept in mind when comparing results. The trade-otT curves for the two stochastic
cases are presented together with the trade-off curve from the deterministic case
in Figure 12. Note that all of the trade-oft curves are very close together. so that
the presence of random shocks does not seem to result in a large deterioration of
the optimal control results, as long as the optimal solutions are calculated in a
closed loop maimer. The reason for this can he seen by looking at the movement
in the level of unborrowed reserves, as shown in Tables 6 and 7. What we find is
that unborrowed reserves generally must move more dramatically in order to
attain policy objectives. This is particularly true when more emphasis is placed
on M I. This is another indication that following an interest rate targetmight he
preferable for the monetary authority. When a heavier emphasis is placed on
interest rates, unborrowed reserves stays much closer to its nominal path.
To summarize these results, it is interesting to note that the closed loop control
is self-correcting, so that the trade-off is not substantially worsened as long as new
observations are used in making the next optimal policy decision. The Federal
TABLE 6
Rrsui.is ui. TRADE-OFF BIiTWFFN Ml AN!) RTB wiiii Q(BORR = 5.000 AN!) DIsTURBANc!:s Annul)
Root-Mean-Square 1)eviations
Experiment QMI) Q(RTBI Ml RTB BORR UR RDIS
A Ix 10K 1,865 6.131 13679 14.992 0710
B 2 x IO x t0 2.734 2.744 5.129 6567 0.263
C 2 x i0 x 108 3.189 1.558 7477 3.431 0.129
D 200 Ix 108 4.582 0.34! 465 774 0.024
E 20 Ix 10K 4.999 0.305 60 242 0.003
F 0 1x i0 5054 0.3)9 tO 180 0.000
TABLE 7
RESULTS 01 TRADEO1:F BETWEEN Ml AND RTB wini Q(BORR) = 5.000 ANi) DiSrURANCES
SUBTRACED
Root-Mean-Square Dex iations
Experimeni QiMI) Q(RTB) Ml RTB BORR UR RDIS
A Ix 10K 0 2.073 4968 10.71 S 11.772 0.554
B 2 x i0 Ix 10 2.945 2.921 4,835 5,688 0.248
C 2 x io 1x IO 3.761 1.648 266 2.862 0.136
D 200 Ix I0 5.570 0.171 498 III 0.026
E 20 IxitJ 6.044 0.207 64 523 0.003
F 0 x i0 6.105 0.242 10 594 0.000DETERMINISTIC
4 STOCHASTIC CLOSED LOOPERRORS ADDED
STOCHASTIC CLOSED LOOP ERRORS SUBTRACTED
Figure 12Trade-off curves, stochasiic experiments
Reserve Board now is operating ina very different way hut may be arrivingat
much the same result. As is evidencedby the published record of policyactions of
the FOMC (starting with the meeting ofFebruary 15, 1972), the existence ofrandom
shocks in the economy has resulted inthe specification of arange of acceptable
values For targeted variables.23 The Fedsstall transforms the specifiedranges on
target variables into an appropriaterange within which the policy instruments
may fluctuate in order to meet policy objectives.The range on acceptable values
for policy variables indicatesthat current policy is predictedon the assumption that policy instrumentsmust be allowed to fluctuateso as to compensate fbr
random disturbances in theeconomy. This same necessary condition holds ifone
formulates policy usingoptimal control, Theroot-mean-square deviations for
unborrowed reserves are in generallarger for the stochastic experimentsthan they are for the deterministicones. This can be seen by lookingat Figure 13, which shows that the optimalpaths for unborrowedreserves in the two stochastic
experiments (E) bound the optimalpath for the corresponding deterministic
experiment.
5. SUMMARYAND CONCLUSIONS
Let us summarizeour results and their possibleimplications for policy making. First,we have observed that thedeternliniSljc closed loop control law adequately corrects forrandom shocks, althoughmore freedom of movementIS




- - STOCHASTIC CLOSED LOOP ERRORS ADDED
STOCHASTIC CLOSED LOOP ERRORS SUBTRACTED
Figure 13Comparison of hR paths stochastic and deterministicexperiments
required with respect to the policyinstrument.24We did not, of course, take into
account our imperfect knowledgeof the true values of the model'scoefficients
when obtaining our stochasticcontrol solutions. If the estimated value ofcritical
coefficients have large standard errors,this could decrease the precision of our
control. Also, we have not exploredfully the limitations inherent in the model's
linearity. Our results might be lessmeaningful if the economy were experiencing
rapid structural change.
In both the deterministic andstochastic cases, we find that the monetary
aggregate Ml can indeed beclosely controlled, but only at the great expenseof
considerable fluctuations in othervariables. The problem does not occurwhen
attention is focused primarily oninterest rates as the policy objective.Interest
rates can be controlled veryclosely without much loss in thecontrol of other
variables. Note that we are not sayingthat it is best to focus on interest ratesfrom
the point of view of overallstabilization policy. If, however, interest rates arethe
intermediate targets of the monetaryauthority, then precise control becomes
easier to attain.
We also found that monetarycontrol is best achieved by administeringthe
discount window to some extent(i.e., by placing some cost on thedeviations of
24 The effects of random shocks are much more serious if thedeterministic control law is applied
in an open loop manner, i.e., without
observing the state-vector each period. We ran one setof stochastic
experiments using open loop control, andfound the root-mean-Square deviations for most variables to











1972borrowings from its not inal path). We(hI'l '°ltthe Proper roleof the discount rate as apolicyinstrument. so that iii our experjm,'rits
the disco1111
wijidosss.as only adinitiistei ed Inditect)) through unhorrowed
reserves The examinaioti of the appropriate role of the discount rateas a policy instrument
will he a subject of future study.
There are other problems in monetary policy winchwe feel could fruitfullyhe approached from the point of view of optimal control. Oneof these iswhether closer control of the money stock or other aggregates couldhe achievedmore easily by placing less emphasis on interest rate targetsarid moreon reserve
targets. In this case the objective function would have the FederalFunds rateas the primary policy instrument, and unhorrowedreserves (or some otherreserve measure, such as reserves available to support private deposits)would he madea target variable. Then we would examine the trade-oilbetween thecontrol of Ml and the control of reserves.
A second important question is whether interniedjatetarget strategiesare desirable in the first place. This could he studied bymaking the moneymarket model a sub-sector of a macro-econonletric model, andthen performingOptimiza- tion experiments in which the targets aremacro variables such a GNP,uneniploy merit, prices. etc. We would like to find out whetherthe resulting optimalpaths
for intermediate variables are anything like(lie target paths thatwe have chosen
for our experiments.
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